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 Time as a form of intuition
Kant’s claim that time is a subjective form of intuition was first proposed in his In-
augural Dissertation “De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis”
of , which he delivered upon being appointed professor of logic and meta-
physics at the university of Konigsberg. It is in this dissertation that Kant for the
first time puts forward his startling claim that time is not objective and real but a
pure form of intuition. Section  ‘On the principles of the form of the sensible
world’ deals with space and time. In x he discusses time, claiming that it is “an
absolutely first formal principle of the sensible world” (AA: , p. ).
“Time is not something objective and real, nor is it a substance, nor
an accident, nor a relation. Time is rather the subjective condition
which is necessary, in virtue of the nature of the human mind, for the
co-ordinating of all sensible things in accordance with a fixed law. It
is a pure intuition” (AA: , p. ).
 e criticisms of Lambert, Mendelssohn and Schultz
is view was immediately criticised in reviews and letters by Lambert, Mendels-
sohn and Schultz. Soon after the publication of the Inaugural Dissertation, Johann
Heinrich Lambert wrote a letter dated . October  to Kant in which he puts
forward an objection to treating time as a form of intuition. Later on he restates the
criticism in a review in the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek (Vol. , No. , )
of Herz’s defence of Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation entitled Betrachtungen aus der
spekulativen Weltweisheit.
“Alle Veranderungen sind an die Zeit gebunden und lassen sich ohne
Zeit nicht gedenken. Sind die Veranderungen real so ist die Zeit real,
was sie auch immer seyn mag. Ist die Zeit nicht real so ist auch keine

Veranderung real. Es daucht mich aber doch, da auch selbst ein
Idealiste wenigstens in seinen Vorstellungen Veranderungen, wie an-
fangen und aufhoren derselben zugeben mu, das wirklich vorgeht
und existirt. Und damit kann die Zeit nicht als etwas nicht reales
angesehen werden” (AA: , p. ).;a
In a letter from . December ,MosesMendelssohnmakes a similar criticism:
“Da die Zeit etwas blo Subjektives seyn sollte, kan ich mich aus
mehrern Grunden nicht bereden. Die Succeion ist doch wenig-
stens eine nothwendige Bedingung der Vorstellungen endlicher Geis-
ter. Nun sind die endlichen Geister nicht nur Subjekte, sondern
auch Objekte der Vorstellungen, so wohl Gottes, als ihrer Mitgeister.
Mithin ist die Folge auf einander, auch als etwas objektives anzuse-
hen”b (AA: , p. ).
e problem is thus that the reality of time seems to follow from the reality
of change. e reality of change, in turn, appears to be undeniable since even an
idealist has to accept that representations change. While it might be granted that
space can be considered as the form of outer sense, it seems that time cannot be
understood merely as the form of inner sense.
Accordingly, it does not seem to be possible for change to be a mere appear-
ance. As Lambert notes in x of the Phanomenologie in his Neues Organon:
“Wenn in dem Schein eine Aenderung vorgeht, so geht auch in derat eine Aen-
derung vor. Es bleibt aber noch unausgemacht, ob sie in demObjecte, oder in dem
Sinn oder in der Verhaltni von beyden, oder in zwey oder in allen drey Stucken
vorgehe. Hingegen aber giebt die Aenderung im Schein das Relative von der wirk-
lichen Aenderung an”c (Lambert: , Band , p. ). at is, if there is a
semblance of change, then there really is a change. ere is only a question of
what it is that is changing, namely whether it is the subject, the object or the rela-
tion between the subject and the object, but there is no question that something
is changing.
We can clarify this issue by considering a closely related problem for treating
time as a feature of the way we represent the world that arises if we focus on the
temporal status of representations. e problem is that if we try to treat temporal-
ity merely as a feature of how we represent the world, then we seem to end up in an
Rough translations are provided in the endnotes.
is problem is modelled on H. A. Pistorius’s critique of transcendental idealism developed
in reviews of Kant’s Prolegomena (reviewed in Vol. , No.  Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, )
and Schultz’s Erlauterungen uber des Herrn Professor Kant Critik der reinen Vernunft (reviewed in
Vol. , No.  Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, ). ere he notes that he could not “sich
davon zu uberzeugen, da die in der Zeit gegebene Empfindungen nur eben so blos Phanomen
waren, als die im Raum gegebene Anschauungen, weil er sich namlich uber die Schwierigkeit nicht
helfen konnte, da weil alsdenn unsre innern Empfindungen oder Vorstellungen nicht Dinge an
sich selbst, sondern Erscheinungen sein muten, nichts als Schein da ware, und kein reelles Object

infinite regress. is is because representations themselves seem to have temporal
properties and to stand in temporal relations. In order for representations to be
in time there would have to be further representations that would represent them
as being in time. at is, if we want to say that representations are not really in
time but are only represented to be in time, then we need further representations
doing the representing, leading us to an infinite regress. To avoid this regress it
seems that we would have to say that representations are not merely represented to
be in time but are really in time. In this case, however, we would be committed
to viewing time as more than a form of intuition. us, if representations are in
time, then it would seem to follow that time cannot merely be a feature of how we
represent the world.
It should be noted that this problem is peculiar to time and cannot be extended
to space. e reality of space can be denied by treating spatiality as a mere appear-
ance that derives from the way we represent the world. Spatiality then pertains only
to the way we represent the world and not to how the world is in itself. While we
can unproblematically treat spatiality as a feature of how we represent the world
since spatiality can be reduced to non-spatial representations, problems arise in the
case of time since representations themselves seem to be temporal which disqual-
ifies them from being a reductive base for temporality. e reality of temporality
seems undeniable since we cannot treat is as a mere appearance that can be reduced
to representations. is is because representations themselves seem to be temporal
objects that exist and change in time. Given that representations are in time, tem-
porality unlike spatiality cannot merely pertain to the content of representations.
Stated abstractly, the problem is that if a feature is derivative, then that from
which this feature (ultimately) derives cannot also be characterised by that feature
(i.e. it cannot equally be derivative). Since, according to transcendental idealism,
temporality is in some sense a derivative feature that is due to how we represent
the world, it follows that that from which temporality derives, namely the way we
represent the world, cannot itself be temporal. Yet, our representations, intuitively,
seem to be temporal, thereby appearing to preclude the possibility that temporality
only pertains to how the world is represented by us and not how it is in itself.
ubrig bliebe, dem etwas erscheine”d (Pistorius: , p. ). It is not clear “wie es namlich sich
als moglich gedenken lasse, da Vorstellungen, die man doch immer als reell, oder als Dinge an
sich selbst voraussetzen mu, wenn man uberhaupt erklaren will, wie ein Scheinen moglich sey,
selbst nur ein Schein seyn konnen, und das was dasjenige dann ist, wodurch und worinn dieser
Schein existiret?”e (Pistorius: , pp. -).
is problem is also noted by McTaggart at the end of his article on the unreality of time.
“And how are we to deal with the appearance itself? If we reduce time and change to appearance,
must it not be to an appearance which changes and which is in time, and is not time, then, shown
to be real after all?” (McTaggart: , p. )

 Kant’s reply
Kant took these criticisms very seriously. In the well-known letter to Herz dated
. February  Kant notes that the objection put forward by Lambert “der
wesentlichste ist, den man dem Lehrbegriff machen kan”f (AA: , p. ). In
this letter he also outlines his response to the objection, which he later on de-
velops in the ‘Elucidation’ of the Transcendental Aesthetic (labelled x in the B-
Edition). ere he characterises the criticism as follows: “Veranderungen sind
wirklich (dies beweiset der Wechsel unserer eigenen Vorstellungen, wenn man gle-
ich alle auere Erscheinungen sammt deren Veranderungen leugnen wollte). Nun
sind Veranderungen nur in der Zeit moglich, folglich ist die Zeit etwas Wirk-
liches”g (A/B).
He then responds to the objection by saying: “Die Beantwortung hat keine
Schwierigkeit. Ich gebe das ganze Argument zu. Die Zeit ist allerdings etwas
Wirkliches, namlich die wirkliche Form der innern Anschauung. Sie hat also sub-
jective Realitat in Ansehung der innern Erfahrung, d. i. ich habe wirklich die
Vorstellung von der Zeit und meinen Bestimmungen in ihr. Sie ist also wirklich,
nicht als Object, sondern als die Vorstellungsart meiner selbst als Objects anzuse-
hen. . . . [footnote: Ich kann zwar sagen: meine Vorstellungen folgen einander;
aber das heit nur, wir sind uns ihrer als in einer Zeitfolge, d. i. nach der Form
des innern Sinnes, bewut. Die Zeit ist darum nicht etwas an sich selbst, auch
keine den Dingen objectiv anhangende Bestimmung]”h (A/B-).
Kant not only gives a response to the objection, but also provides a diagnosis of
why this criticism came so naturally to many of the people who read the Inaugural
Dissertation. e source of the objection is traced to a Cartesian understanding
of self-knowledge, according to which we have immediate access to our mental
states. is Cartesianism is most explicit in Schultz’s review of the Inaugural Dis-
sertation when he says: “Denn vermoge der innerlichen Empfindung beschauet die
Seele sich selbst und alles, was gegenwartig in ihr vorgehet, namlich, sie empfindet
unmittelbar die Gegenwart aller Veranderungen, die in ihr wirklich geschehen, sie
mogen herruhren, woher sie wollen, und entweder Eindrucke von auern Dingen,
oder reine Vorstellungen des Verstandes, oder volitiones seyn, und ist sich dahero
derselben bewut”i (Schultz: , Vol. , Monday . November, p. ).
Kant’s critics privileged the inner (i.e. the temporal) over the outer (i.e. the
spatial), claiming that while knowledge of the self is direct, knowledge of outer
objects is inferential. By restricting the objects of which we are immediately aware
to mental items, one excludes immediate awareness of spatial items, but does not
exclude immediate awareness of temporal items. While representations are intu-
itively taken to be entities that exist in time and change in time, they are usually
Regarding Kant’s use of the phrase ‘I admit the entire argument’, it is worth pointing out
that “the phrase ’I concede the entire argument’ (concede totum argumentum) was a standard
response employed by participants in scholastic disputations. e phrase was used to charge that
the opponent had reached an irrelevant conclusion” (Falkenstein: , p.  endnote ).

not considered as spatial entities, making it the case that we are not immediately
aware of any spatial items, which, in turn, implies that knowledge of spatial en-
tities is not immediate but inferential. It is for this reason that they were willing
to accept that space could be a form of intuition, while denying that this status
could be attributed to time. Given this conception of knowledge, it is not possi-
ble to infer from a subject’s being aware of things standing in spatial relations to
there being anything that is really spatial. is is because spatiality might pertain
merely to the content of representations. Yet it is possible to infer from a subject’s
being aware of things standing in temporal relations to there being something that
is really temporal. e succession of representations of which we are aware cannot
pertain to the content of representations but must instead pertain to the represen-
tations themselves. at is, given the Cartesian understanding of self-knowledge
we can be directly aware of representations and their temporal relations.
Kant’s response involves a radical rejection of the traditional understanding
of self-knowledge. He rejects the view that the inner is epistemically privileged
over the outer. Rather than granting epistemic priority to the inner, our knowl-
edge of both inner and outer objects is restricted to knowledge of appearances.
One has to realise that objects of inner and outer sense “beide, ohne da man
ihre Wirklichkeit als Vorstellungen bestreiten darf, gleichwohl nur zur Erschein-
ung gehoren”j (A/B). Kant’s account of inner sense is thus completely anal-
ogous to his account of outer sense. In each case, representations are mediated by
the form of intuition and only represent objects as they appear to us. Whether
we are dealing with an inner object or an outer object, in each case an affection
relation provides a manifold of intuition (inner manifold v. outer manifold) and
each time the manifold is processed and mediated by the form of intuition (form
of inner sense: time v. form of outer sense: space). Kant can then claim that we
only know ourselves as we appear and that we lack knowledge of the self as a thing
in itself. It is the adoption of this anti-Cartesian position that allows him to retain
his commitment to understanding time as a form of intuition. Kant’s response
is thus a strong form of anti-Cartesianism that involves a rejection of claims to
knowledge of the self as it is in itself. Inner phenomena, like outer phenomena are
only known to us as appearances.
To retain the idea that time is a subjective form of intuition, Kant has to argue
that the representations that are in time and that change are appearances. is
conflicts with an understanding of self-knowledge whereby we have knowledge
of the self as it is in itself, whereby we have direct access to our mental states.
is Cartesian conception is rejected by Kant. Rather than having access to our
mental states as they are in themselves, our knowledge of ourselves is mediated by
the form of inner sense. e mediation resulting from the form of inner sense
is anti-Cartesianism also plays an important role in Kant’s discussions of idealism, in partic-
ular in the Fourth Paralogism of the A-Edition and in the Refutation of Idealism in the B-Edition.

undercuts direct access to our mental states as they are in themselves. As a result,
we do not have access to the representations as they are in themselves, but only
have access to representations as they appear. is implies that we are only aware
of appearances and not of the mental states themselves. We only have access to
the intentional contents of the mental states, i.e. to what is represented, and these
contents are always mediated by the form of inner sense. Accordingly, we can only
have knowledge of ourselves as we appear to ourselves.
To make sense of this view we need to distinguish between noumenal repre-
sentations or mental states and the intentional objects that they represent. is
view allows us to claim that we do not have direct access to our mental states as
they are in themselves but are only aware of the intentional contents of these states,
whereby our awareness of these contents has been mediated by the form of inner
sense. In this way we can identify the temporal intentional objects as the appear-
ances of which we are aware by means of inner sense, while making room for the
underlying mental states that exist in themselves and to which these appearances
can be reduced.
As a result, we can claim that the mental states themselves are not temporal
and do not undergo change. ey are “weder veranderlich noch unveranderlich
. . . ; die Dinge der Welt sind objektiv oder an sich selbst weder in einerley Zus-
tande in verschiedenen Zeiten, noch in verschiedenem Zustande denn sie werden
in diesem Verstande gar nicht in der Zeit vorgestellt”k (AA: , p. ). While
representations in themselves are not temporal and do not undergo change, appear-
ances of representations are represented to be temporal and to undergo change. It
is only the intentional contents of the noumenal mental states that are temporal
and that are represented to be changing. is means that it is no longer possible
to infer from the temporality of the representations of which we are aware to the
temporality of the representations themselves. It does not follow from the fact that
representations are represented to be changing that the representations themselves
undergo changes.
Once we accept that the objects of inner sense, like those of outer sense, are
appearances and that we only know ourselves as we appear, we can see that in-
ner sense only provides us with the appearance of change. e inference from an
appearance of change to a change of appearances is thereby invalidated. Pace Lam-
bert it can then turn out that all alteration is mere appearance and only pertains to
how things appear and not to how things are in themselves. All we have is appear-
ances of change. ere is no change of appearances, no succession of appearances.
“Ich kann nicht einmal sagen: die innere Erscheinung verandere sich”l (AA: , p.
). “Kant here appears to be taking a radical line indeed – that no items whatever
stand in temporal relations, not even our own mental episodes. . . . [T]here is con-
sciousness of succession, but no succession of conscious states. . . . [Any temporal
relation] must occur exclusively as an experiential content – only within experi-
ences and not between them” (van Cleve: , pp. -).
Kant wants to say that in the same way that bodies are represented to be spa-

tially ordered without being spatial in themselves, representations are represented
to be temporally ordered without being temporal in themselves. ese two cases
seem to be disanalogous since in the case of time there seems to be a need for
further representations doing the representing, leading to a regress. is problem
can, however, be solved by distinguishing the noumenal mental state from the in-
tentional object, allowing non-temporal mental states to have temporally ordered
intentional objects. Kant can then claim that the represented objects are repre-
sented to occupy temporal locations, without the representations themselves hav-
ing temporal locations. It needs to be denied that representations in themselves are
temporal entities that exist and change in time. is means that only appearances
of representations are in time, not the representations themselves.
Accordingly, we can reduce the temporality of the contents of awareness to
non-temporal features of the noumenal mental states. ere is something that is
real, namely the mental states. ey are responsible for the appearance of change,
but they themselves do not change. eir intentional objects are in time since they
are represented to be in time, but they themselves are not in time. is then allows
us to say that “Veranderungen etwas wirkliches seyn . . . [insoweit] etwas wirkliches
der Erscheinung correspondiere”m (AA: , p. ).
 Conclusion
e objections raised by Lambert, Mendelssohn and Schultz assume that we have
direct access to our representations and can know that they are temporal, that they
are in time and change in time. Accordingly, it would seem that we cannot treat
time as an appearance, as merely a feature of the way we represent the world. Since
representations themselves are taken to be temporal entities, it would follow that
temporality cannot be reduced to a feature of the way things are represented to be.
Instead, it would have to be a feature of how things really are.
By distinguishing noumenal representations from their intentional objects Kant
can avoid this problem. Representations understood as intentional objects are in-
deed temporal. However, they are only appearances and are only temporal because
they are represented to be temporal. Temporality thus pertains only to the content
of our awareness and not to the representations themselves. e representations
themselves are not temporal and are neither changing nor unchanging. ey per-
tain to the self considered as a thing in itself.
is means that the Cartesian conception of self-knowledge is mistaken. We
lack epistemic access to the representations themselves and only have access to
their intentional contents. We are aware not of the representations but of their
intentional objects, of what they represent. Temporality can then be restricted
in such a way that it only pertains to the intentional objects of representations,
allowing us to claim that representations themselves are not in time and do not
undergo change. Only the intentional contents of these mental states are in time

since they have been subjected to the form of inner sense and are represented to
be in time.
In other words, appearances are represented to be temporal and are represented
to be changing in time. Representations themselves, however, are not in time
and do not change. Accordingly, Kant can consistently hold that time is merely
a feature of the way we represent the world, without representations themselves
being in time since it is only the intentional objects of which we are aware that are
in time.
For helpful comments, I would like to thank Andrew Roche and Anna Tomaszewska, as well
as audiences at St Andrews and at the Kant Kongress in Pisa.

Notes
aAll alterations are bound to time and cannot be thought without time. If the alterations are
real, then time is real, whatever it may be. If time is not real, then no alteration is real either. I think
however that even an idealist must admit alterations that really happen and exist, like beginning
and ceasing to be, in his representations. And therewith time cannot be seen as something that is
not real.
bat time is supposed to be something merely subjective, is something of which I cannot
convince myself for several reasons. Succession is at least a necessary condition of representations
of finite spirits. Now, finite spirits are not only subjects, but also objects of representations of God,
as well as other spirits. erewith succession upon one another should also been seen as something
objective.
cIf an alteration takes place in appearance, then an alteration also takes place in fact. It still
remains undetermined though whether it takes place in the object, or in the sense, or in the relation
of the two, or in two or in all three parts. By contrast the alteration in appearance indicates the
relative of the real alteration.
dconvince himself that the sensations that are given in time are equally mere phenomena as the
intuitions given in space, because he could not overcome the difficulty that as soon as our inner
sensations or representations would have to be not things in themselves but appearances, nothing
other than appearance would be there and no real object would remain to which something would
appear.
ehow it is possible to think that representations, which we always have to presuppose as real
or as things in themselves if one wants to explain how an appearing is possible, can themselves be
mere appearance and what that then is whereby and wherein this appearance exists?
fis the most fundamental that can be raised against the doctrine.
gAlterations are real (this is proved by the change of our own representations, even if one would
deny all outer appearances together with their alterations). Now alterations are possible only in
time, therefore time is something real.
here is no difficulty in answering. I admit the entire argument. Time is certainly something
real, namely the real form of inner intuition. It therefore has subjective reality in regard to inner
experience, i.e., I really have the representation of time and ofmy determinations in it. It is therefore
to be regarded really not as object but as the way of representing myself as object. . . . [footnote:
I can, to be sure, say: my representations succeed one another; but that only means that we are
conscious of them as in a temporal sequence, i.e., according to the form of inner sense. Time is
not on that account something in itself, nor any determination objectively adhering to things.]
iBecause by means of inner sense the soul observes itself and everything that is presently hap-
pening in it, namely it senses immediately the presence of all alterations that are really taking place
in it and is therewith conscious of them, wherever they may come from, whether they be impres-
sions of outer things or pure representations of the understanding or volitions.
jboth, without their reality as representations being disputed, nevertheless belong only to ap-
pearance.
kneither mutable nor immutable . . . ; the things of the world are objectively or in themselves
neither in a single condition at different times, nor in different conditions since in this respect they
are not at all represented in time.
lI cannot even say: the inner appearance is changing.
malterations are something real . . . [insofar as] something real corresponds to the appearance.

References
[] F, L. Kant’s Intuitionism: a commentary on the Transcendental Aes-
thetic. University of Toronto Press, .
[] K, I. Kants gesammelte Schriften. Reimer/de Gruyter, .
[] L, J. H. Neues Organon oder Gedanken uber die Erforschung und
Bezeichnung des Wahren und dessen Unterscheidung vom Irrthum und Schein,
vol. Zweyter Band. Johann Wendler, .
[] L, J. H. M. Herz Betrachtungen aus der spekulativen Weltweisheit.
Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek ,  (), –.
[] MT, J. E. e Unreality of Time. Mind ,  (), –.
[] P, H. A. Prolegomena zu einer jeden kunftigen Metaphysik, die als
Wissenschaft wird auftreten konnen. Von Immanuel Kant. Allgemeine deutsche
Bibliothek ,  (), –.
[] P, H. A. Erlauterungen uber des Herrn Professor Kant Critik der
reinen Vernunft von Joh. Schultze, Konigl. Preuischer Hofprediger. Allge-
meine deutsche Bibliothek ,  (), –.
[] S, J. Immanuel Kant de mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma
et principiis dissertatio pro loco professionis log. et. metaphys. ordin. Re-
giom. die XXI. Aug. . Konigsbergische Gelehrte und Politische Zeitungen
 & , Freytag . November & Montag . November (), –
& –.
[]  C, J. Problems from Kant. Oxford University Press, .

